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Defining the Public Health Impact of
Drug-Resistant Streptococcus pneumoniae:
Report of a Working Group
Summary
Streptococcus pneumoniae is a leading cause of morbidity and mortality in
the United States, resulting each year in an estimated 3,000 cases of meningitis,
50,000 cases of bacteremia, 500,000 cases of pneumonia, and 7,000,000 cases of
otitis media. As with most respiratory pathogens, rapid, sensitive, and specific
diagnostic tests are not available; thus, early in the course of illness, diagnosis
of  S. pneumoniae infection is usually presumptive, and the choice of antimicro-
bial therapy is nearly always empiric. In the past, isolates of  S. pneumoniae
were uniformly susceptible to penicillin; however, penicillin-resistant and
multidrug-resistant strains have begun to emerge in the United States and are
widespread in some communities. The full impact of the problem is unknown
because infection with drug-resistant  S. pneumoniae (DRSP) is not a reportable
condition for most of the United States. To develop a strategy for minimizing the
impact of DRSP, in June 1994, CDC convened a working group of public health
practitioners, clinical laboratorians, health-care providers, and representatives
of key professional societies. This report describes the three goals developed by
the working group that address surveillance, epidemiologic investigation, and
prevention and control of DRSP, and the objectives for each goal.
INTRODUCTION
Streptococcus pneumoniae infections are among the leading causes worldwide of
illness and death for young children, persons who have underlying debilitating
medical conditions, and the elderly (1 ). Each year in the United States, pneumococ-
cal disease is estimated to account for 3,000 cases of meningitis, 50,000 cases of
bacteremia, 500,000 cases of pneumonia, and 7,000,000 cases of otitis media (2 ).
Case-fatality rates vary by age and underlying illnesses of patients; however, case-
fatality rates for some high-risk patients have been reported to be >40% for bactere-
mia and 55% for meningitis, despite appropriate antimicrobial therapy (3 ). A vaccine
for the 23 most common serotypes of S. pneumoniae has been available since the
early 1980s. The Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP) recommends
that the vaccine be administered to persons ≥2 years of age who have certain under-
lying medical conditions associated with increased risk for pneumococcal disease and
its complications and to all persons ≥65 years of age (3). However, despite its availabil-
ity, the vaccine is underutilized. As of 1993, data from CDC’s National Health Interview
Survey indicated that only 27% of persons ≥65 years of age had been vaccinated (4 ).
In the past, S. pneumoniae was almost uniformly susceptible to penicillin, allowing
most physicians to treat persons who had severe infections with penicillin alone with-
out testing for resistance. Since the 1960s, however, resistance to penicillin and other
antimicrobial agents has spread rapidly and was first reported in Australia in 1967, in
New Guinea in 1969, in South Africa in 1977, and in many other countries throughout
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Africa, Asia, and Europe (5,6 ). In the United States, high-level resistance to penicillin
has increased substantially in the last decade. Investigations of outbreaks by CDC
have revealed that resistance to penicillin varies by region; in some areas of the
United States, as many as 30% of pneumococcal isolates are resistant to penicillin
(7,8 ). Also, the incidence of drug-resistant infections can change rapidly (9 ). A smaller
yet substantial percentage of isolates is also resistant to multiple (i.e., two or more)
antimicrobial drugs; some are susceptible only to vancomycin. Within communities,
the proportion of pneumococcal illnesses caused by drug-resistant S. pneumoniae
(DRSP) among children may be markedly different from that among adults.
Therapy for invasive pneumococcal disease and for milder illnesses (e.g., otitis me-
dia) remains empiric because rapid, sensitive, and specific diagnostic tests are not
available. Although the choice of antimicrobial agents for empiric therapy should be
guided by the regional prevalence of DRSP, the prevalence of resistance to penicillin is
unknown for most areas of the United States because DRSP infection has not been a
reportable condition. Consequently, for these infections, therapy often consists of
prescribing antimicrobial drugs that are either not necessary or are too broad. Inap-
propriate empiric or prophylactic use of antimicrobial drugs contributes to the
development of DRSP.
Rapid emergence of resistance to antimicrobial drugs among other bacteria also
has been documented. This trend of waning susceptibility has fostered public con-
cern, as reported in nationally syndicated magazines and recently published books
(10,11 ). Treating patients who have resistant organisms often requires both pro-
longed hospitalization and the use of expensive alternative antimicrobial drugs. New
drugs to combat drug-resistant pathogens are being developed but may not be readily
available (12 ).
In the United States, prolonged hospitalization and the use of more expensive an-
timicrobial agents have increased the cost of treating resistant infections, which is
estimated to range from $100 million to $30 billion per year (13 ). Many of these issues
were addressed in a 1992 report by the Institute of Medicine, Emerging Infections:
Microbial Threats to Health in the United States, which emphasized the need for im-
proved surveillance and control of pathogens that are resistant to antimicrobial drugs
(14 ). Although as of December 1995, 13 states and one city health department have
made mandatory the reporting of DRSP, no coordinated national effort has been initi-
ated previously to address this problem.
The spread of DRSP presents a challenge to clinicians, laboratorians, and public
health practitioners to identify and implement prevention and control methods to
minimize the complications of DRSP infections (e.g., greater duration and severity of
illness, health-care expenses, and mortality). In June 1994, a CDC-convened working
group of public health practitioners, clinical laboratorians, health-care providers, and
representatives of key professional societies identified the development of a nation-
wide laboratory-based surveillance system as the essential first step in a strategy of
surveillance, investigation, prevention, and control of DRSP. The strategy is intended
to be flexible and may change as a result of data obtained during initial phases of
its implementation and from new studies. This report describes the three goals
developed by the working group—surveillance, epidemiologic investigation, and pre-
vention and control of DRSP—and the objectives for each goal.
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GOALS AND OBJECTIVES
Goal I. Surveillance: define and monitor the prevalence and
geographic distribution of DRSP and rapidly recognize the
emergence of new patterns of resistance.
The incidence of penicillin-resistant S. pneumoniae has increased in certain senti-
nel sites in the United States (1 ). These sites detected a 60-fold increase in high-level
resistance to penicillin among isolates from several large hospitals located primarily
in urban areas; however, these data are not representative of many communities in
other parts of the country. Resistance to antimicrobial drugs appears to vary among
communities and even among hospitals in the same city. Prevention or control
programs designed to address increasing and variable resistance to antimicrobial
drugs should include surveillance to detect levels of resistance specific to different
communities.
Objective A. Establish nationwide mandatory reporting of DRSP.
Concern about increasing resistance to antimicrobial agents has prompted 13 state
health departments (Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia, Michigan, Minnesota,
Missouri, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, and South
Carolina) and the New York City Health Department to institute regulations requiring
laboratories to report DRSP isolates from certain anatomic sites (e.g., cerebrospinal
fluid [CSF] and blood). To ensure that such a surveillance system has maximum
participation and more nationally representative data, a nationwide requirement for
reporting DRSP isolates is needed.
In late 1994, the DRSP working group submitted a proposal to the Council of State
and Territorial Epidemiologists (CSTE) that required all states to report invasive
infections caused by DRSP. This proposal was approved by CSTE in January 1995
(15 ). Although regulatory authority for reporting nationally notifiable diseases resides
at the state level, approval by CSTE provides a basis for state health officials to en-
courage their state legislators to adopt the measure. 
Objective B. Improve the detection of DRSP in laboratories by promoting
appropriate interpretive standards for identification and susceptibility
testing of  S. pneumoniae.
On the basis of National Committee for Clinical Laboratory Standards (NCCLS) in-
terpretive standards, all isolates of S. pneumoniae from usually sterile sites should be
tested for penicillin resistance (16 ). Pneumococcal resistance to penicillin can be
screened initially by using a 1 µg oxacillin disk; penicillin resistance is considered
probable with oxacillin zone size ≤19 mm. The screening approach is highly sensitive
(99%) and specific (80%–90%) and should detect almost all isolates resistant to peni-
cillin and extended-spectrum cephalosporins (e.g., ceftriaxone or cefotaxime). Isolates
found to be nonsusceptible by oxacillin disk should then be subjected to quantitative
MIC testing against penicillin, an extended-spectrum cephalosporin, chloramphenicol,
vancomycin, and other drugs clinically indicated to treat the patient. MIC testing
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should be performed by using methods determined by NCCLS to be valid and reliable
(e.g., broth microdilution, agar dilution, disk diffusion, or antimicrobial gradient
strips).
A recent CDC survey of laboratories providing service to large academic pediatric
centers indicated that 85% of these laboratories were screening pneumococcal iso-
lates for penicillin resistance by using a 1 µg oxacillin disk, a method recommended by
NCCLS (CDC, unpublished data). Data from a statewide survey performed by the Colo-
rado State Department of Health demonstrated that of 78 laboratories surveyed,
57 (73%) were using oxacillin screening for S. pneumoniae isolates for penicillin
susceptibility; 29 (37%) were screening all isolates. A survey from the New York City
Department of Health demonstrated that 68% of hospital and commercial laboratories
in New York City screened with oxacillin testing, either all isolates or all sterile site
isolates. The degree to which smaller hospital laboratories in other areas of the coun-
try adhere to the NCCLS interpretive standards for pneumococcal testing is less well
known. Many laboratories also are in periods of transition while implementing meth-
ods newly approved by NCCLS, such as changes in interpretive breakpoints (e.g., zone
diameters) and recommendations against the use of automated methods of minimal
inhibitory concentration (MIC) susceptibility testing for S. pneumoniae (17,18 ).
The current mechanism for disseminating information from NCCLS to laborato-
ries should be augmented to reach the majority of laboratorians and health-care
providers. Thus, distribution should be expanded by publishing NCCLS’s current rec-
ommendations on routine testing and reporting of S. pneumoniae and interpretative
standards in publications likely to be received by laboratorians and health-care provid-
ers (Tables 1–3). In addition, the working group has asked selected researchers to
submit letters to appropriate laboratory-oriented publications encouraging the
prompt institution of NCCLS interpretive standards for pneumococcal testing. The
published recommendations should stress prompt adherence to NCCLS interpretive
standards and promote the use of appropriate methods for MIC testing.
The interpretive standards are included in this report to disseminate the most
current recommendations concerning MIC interpretive breakpoints (Tables 1–3). Addi-
tionally, the CDC electronic surveillance module for capturing DRSP prevalence data
(DRSP-PHLIS [Public Health Laboratory Information System], v. 3.1) has incorporated
the 1994 NCCLS interpretive breakpoints into the computer menu to assist users of
this surveillance system with consistent interpretation of MIC data. Clinical laboratori-
ans who suspect a pneumococcal isolate to be nonsusceptible to vancomycin should
a) verify the results, b) save the isolate, and c) report the confirmed results to the
respective state health department and to CDC (Childhood and Respiratory Diseases
Branch, Division of Bacterial and Mycotic Diseases, National Center for Infectious
Diseases).
Objective C. Develop an electronic, laboratory-based surveillance system
capable of reporting DRSP and other conditions.
Surveillance for pneumococcal disease has been limited in the past. Since 1979,
CDC has been actively monitoring trends in invasive pneumococcal disease at
13 sentinel sites nationwide. In addition, CDC-funded, population-based surveillance
projects have been under development since October 1994 to monitor pneumococcal
disease at selected locations in several states (i.e., California, Connecticut, Georgia,
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Maryland, Minnesota, Oregon, Tennessee, and Texas). Researchers at academic
medical centers have gathered data on DRSP and other antimicrobial-resistant
organisms such as methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) and
vancomycin-resistant enterococcus (VRE). Although these activities have yielded use-
ful information regarding the incidence of DRSP, they reflect the levels of resistance
specific to those sites. Geographic variation in resistance to antimicrobial drugs
among communities and among hospitals in the same community is common.
Population-based laboratory surveillance is necessary to reflect accurately local
geographic and temporal trends in DRSP. The surveillance system should capture data
from as many laboratories as possible within each community. These data must be
aggregated, analyzed, and reported to local health-care providers in a timely manner.
Clinicians need DRSP prevalence data specific to their community to select appropri-
ate antimicrobial agents when empirically treating persons who have pneumococcal
infections. For example, in communities that have a high incidence of DRSP, persons
who have life-threatening infections might receive therapy with vancomycin in combi-
nation with an extended-spectrum cephalosporin until results of CSF or blood cultures
are known. Additionally, in areas known to have low levels of pneumococci resis-
tant to extended-spectrum cephalosporins, empiric vancomycin use can be avoided,
thereby reducing overuse of an important antimicrobial drug. Rapid increases
in pneumococcal resistance patterns have occurred over a short time in many
TABLE 1. Suggested groupings of approved antimicrobial agents* that should be
considered for routine testing and reporting of Streptococcus pneumoniae  by clinical
microbiology laboratories†
Groupings Antimicrobial agents
Group A: Primary test and report Penicillin (oxacillin disk)
Erythromycin§¶
Trimethoprim/sulfamethoxazole§
Group B: Primary test, report selectively Vancomycin
Tetracycline§
Chloramphenicol
Group C: Supplemental, report selectively Ofloxacin
*Approved by the Food and Drug Administration.
†Adapted with permission from the National Committee for Clinical Laboratory Standards
(NCCLS). Performance standards for antimicrobial susceptibility testing (fifth informational
supplement). Villanova, PA: NCCLS, 1994; NCCLS document vol. 14, no. 16, M100-S5, M7-A3,
Table 1A.
§Only results of testing with penicillin, chloramphenicol, vancomycin, and cefotaxime or
ceftriaxone (if tested by a dilution method as outlined in NCCLS document M7 of the fifth
informational supplement vol. 14. no. 16, 1994) should be reported routinely with blood and
CSF isolates of S. pneumoniae  recovered from patients who have life-threatening infections
(e.g., meningitis and bacteremia).
¶Susceptibility and resistance to azithromycin and clarithromycin can be predicted by suscep-
tibility testing of erythromycin.
NOTE: Selection of the most appropriate antimicrobial agents to test and report is a decision
best made by each clinical laboratory in consultation with infectious disease practitioners, the
pharmacy, and the pharmacy and infection-control committees of the medical staff. The
antimicrobial agents listed above in each grouping have, during in vitro tests, demonstrated
acceptable efficacy. Considerations in the assignment of agents to Groups A, B, and C include
clinical efficacy, prevalence of resistance, minimizing emergence of resistance, cost, and current
consensus recommendations for first choice and alternative drugs. Tests on selected agents
may be useful for infection control.
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communities; therefore, recommendations regarding empiric therapy must be based
on the most recent data available. 
Public health practitioners also will benefit from knowledge of communitywide
trends in pneumococcal resistance. For example, if such practitioners identify areas
within their jurisdictions with high levels of resistance requiring more immediate con-
trol measures, efforts can then be directed toward increasing vaccine use in these
communities to prevent illness in persons who are at high risk for pneumococcal ill-
ness. These vaccination efforts should be part of a broader campaign to increase
vaccine use in general. Laboratory surveillance for invasive pneumococcal isolates
and their susceptibility patterns can be used also to monitor changes in pneumococcal
TABLE 2. Zone diameter interpretive standards and equivalent minimum inhibitory
concentration (MIC) breakpoints for Streptococcus pneumoniae*
Antimicrobial agent
Disk
content
(µg)
Zone diameter†
(nearest whole mm)
Equivalent MIC
breakpoints§ (µg/mL)
Resistant Intermediate Susceptible Resistant Susceptible
Azithromycin¶ 15 ≤13 14–17 ≥18 ≥2 ≤0.50
Chloramphenicol 30 ≤20 — ≥21 ≥8 ≤4.00
Clarithromycin¶ 15 ≤16 17–20 ≥21 ≥2 ≤0.50
Clindamycin¶  2 ≤15 16–18 ≥19 ≥1 ≤0.25
Erythromycin 15 ≤15 16–20 ≥21 ≥4 ≤0.50
Ofloxacin  5 ≤12 13–15 ≥16 ≥8 ≤2.00
Penicillin
(oxacillin disk)**
 1 — — ≥20 — ≤0.06
Rifampin¶  5 ≤16 17–18 ≥19 ≥4 ≤1.00
Tetracycline 30 ≤17 18–21 ≥22 ≥8 ≤2.00
Trimethoprim/
sulfamethoxazole
1.25/23.75 ≤15 16–18 ≥19 ≥4/76 ≤0.50/9.50
Vancomycin†† 30 — — ≥17 — ≤1.00
 *Adapted with permission from the National Committee for Clinical Laboratory Standards
(NCCLS). Performance standards for antimicrobial susceptibility testing (fifth informational
supplement). Villanova, PA: NCCLS, 1994; NCCLS document vol. 14. no. 16, M100-S5, M2-A5,
Table 2C.
†These zone diameter standards apply only to tests performed by using Mueller-Hinton agar
supplemented with 5% sheep blood.
§These values represent MIC breakpoints used in determining approximate zone size
interpretive criteria. They relate to MICs determined by M7 methodology. Equivalent MIC
breakpoints relate to tests performed by broth microdilution using cation-adjusted
Mueller-Hinton Broth with 2%–5% lysed horse blood.
¶Zone diameters and MIC breakpoints are considered tentative for 1995.
**Isolates of pneumococci with oxacillin zone sizes of ≥20 mm are susceptible (MIC
≤0.06 µg/mL) to penicillin and can be considered susceptible to ampicillin, amoxicillin,
amoxicillin/clavulanic acid, ampicillin/sulbactam, cefaclor, cefepime, cefetamet, cefixime,
cefotaxime, cefprozil, ceftibuten, ceftriaxone, cefuroxime, cefpodoxime, ceftizoxime,
imipenem, and loracarbef for approved indications, and these agents need not be tested.
A penicillin MIC should be determined on isolates of S. pneumoniae with oxacillin zone
sizes of ≤19 mm. The disk test does not distinguish penicillin intermediate strains (i.e.,
MICs=0.12–1.0 µg/mL) from strains that are penicillin-resistant (i.e., MICs ≥2.0 µg/mL).
Reliable disk diffusion tests for cefotaxime and ceftriaxone do not yet exist; their in vitro
activity is best assessed by using an MIC method.
††The absence of resistant strains precludes defining any results categories other than
susceptible. If clinical laboratorians suspect a pneumococcal isolate to be nonsusceptible
to vancomycin, they should 1) verify the reports, 2) save the isolate, and 3) report the
confirmed result to the respective state health department and to CDC.
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incidence after the introduction of protein conjugate pneumococcal vaccines that are
now being developed for use in children and adults.
To decrease the burden (e.g., time, staffing, and other resources) to laboratory per-
sonnel, any system for laboratory-based reporting should use existing computerized
data that might be already stored  electronically in a laboratory information system
(LIS). In addition, reporting software should be flexible enough to receive and manage
data for multiple laboratory-reportable conditions (e.g., Haemophilus influenzae type
B and Neisseria meningitidis).
A laboratory-based surveillance system developed for DRSP should use electronic
data management and transfer methods when appropriate and allow for feedback of
information to the laboratory, state and local health departments, CDC, and health-
care professionals (Figure 1). The software and the methods of data transfer chosen
TABLE 3. Minimum inhibitory concentration (MIC) interpretive standards (µg/mL) for
Streptococcus pneumoniae*†
Antimicrobial agent Susceptible Intermediate Resistant
Azithromycin ≤0.50 1.00 ≥2.00
Cefotaxime§ ≤0.50 1.00 ≥2.00
Cefepime ≤0.50 1.00 ≥2.00
Ceftriaxone§ ≤0.50 1.00 ≥2.00
Cefuroxime axetil (oral) ≤0.50 1.00 ≥2.00
Chloramphenicol ≤4.00 — ≥8.00
Clarithromycin ≤0.50 1.00 ≥2.00
Clindamycin ≤0.25 0.50 ≥1.00
Erythromycin ≤0.50 1.00–2.00 ≥4.00
Imipenem ≤0.12 0.25–0.50 ≥1.00
Ofloxacin ≤2.00 4.00 ≥8.00
Penicillin¶ ≤0.06 0.10–1.00 ≥2.00
Rifampin ≤1.00 2.00 ≥4.00
Tetracycline ≤2.00 4.00 ≥8.00
Trimethoprim/sulfamethoxazole ≤0.50/9.50 1.00/19.00–2.00/38.00 ≥4/76
Vancomycin** ≤1.00 — —
 *Adapted with permission from the National Committee for Clinical Laboratory Standards
(NCCLS). Performance standards for antimicrobial susceptibility testing (fifth informational
supplement). Villanova, PA: NCCLS, 1994; NCCLS document vol. 14. no. 16, M100-S5, M7-A3,
Table 2C.
†These interpretive standards are applicable to only broth microdilution susceptibility tests
with S. pneumoniae  using cation-adjusted Mueller-Hinton broth with 2%–5% lysed horse
blood.
§When recovered from patients who have meningitis, strains in the intermediate category
may require therapy with maximum doses of the drug.
¶A pneumococcal isolate that is susceptible to penicillin can be considered susceptible to
amoxicillin, amoxicillin/clavulanic acid, ampicillin, ampicillin/sulbactam, cefaclor, cefepime,
cefetamet, cefixime, cefotaxime, cefprozil, ceftibuten, ceftriaxone, cefuroxime, cefpodoxime,
ceftizoxime, imipenem, and loracarbef for approved indications. Testing of these agents
(except cefepime, cefotaxime, ceftriaxone, or cefuroxime axetil) against penicillin-
intermediate or penicillin-resistant isolates is not recommended. Currently, reliable
interpretive criteria for these agents are not available. Physicians should be informed that
clinical response rates with these agents may be lower in strains that are not susceptible
to penicillin.
**The absence of resistant strains precludes defining any results categories other than
susceptible. If clinical laboratorians suspect a pneumococcal isolate to be nonsusceptible
to vancomycin, they should 1) verify the results, 2) save the isolate, and 3) report the
confirmed result to the respective state health department and to CDC.
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for electronic reporting should be expandable and standardized and should allow for
reporting conditions other than DRSP. A proposed electronic, laboratory-based sys-
tem is described in this report (Appendix).
Goal II. Investigation: improve the understanding of the
epidemiology and clinical impact of DRSP.
Objective A. Identify risk factors for development of resistance to
antimicrobial drugs by conducting epidemiologic investigations in
communities that have unusually high or low levels of DRSP.
Levels of pneumococcal antimicrobial resistance can vary among communities.
Identifying regions that have unusually high or low levels of resistance, as well as
identifying outbreaks caused by resistant strains, will assist investigators in more
accurately characterizing the epidemiology of DRSP and in developing methods to
prevent and control the complications of DRSP-related illness. Molecular methods will
be employed to track epidemiologically the spread of highly resistant strains and to
gain further understanding of mechanisms of resistance to antimicrobial drugs. By
focusing on communities that have unusually high levels of resistance to antimicro-
bial drugs, investigators can evaluate risk factors that promote the development of
antimicrobial resistance. CDC and state and local health departments also should
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focus investigations on communities with low levels of resistance to antimicrobial
drugs to identify factors that have deterred the increase of antimicrobial resistance
and to implement programs for preventing the spread of DRSP. Comparing communi-
ties with high and low levels of resistance can help to identify risk factors for
antimicrobial resistance. Studies are currently being conducted in several cities to
identify risk factors for development of DRSP and for increased morbidity from these
infections.
Objective B. Determine outcome and treatment costs of DRSP infections
and formulate recommendations for changing empiric antimicrobial
therapy on the basis of community-specific levels of resistance to
antimicrobial drugs.
CDC studies are under way to determine the cost of treatment and outcome of in-
vasive DRSP infections. This information will be used to develop models that public
health officials at the state and local levels can use to determine thresholds for recom-
mending changes in antimicrobial therapy.
Because initial therapy for pneumococcal infection is usually empiric, the selection
of antimicrobial agents should be guided by the regional prevalence of DRSP. Surveil-
lance for DRSP will provide data on community-specific levels of resistance. These
data can be useful in deciding when to change empiric therapy. Although no consen-
sus exists for this decision making, many factors (e.g., outcome of infection, cost of
treating infection, susceptibility of the population, and access to medical care) may be
important for determining a threshold at which empiric therapy should be changed.
Through the process of decision analysis, these factors can be incorporated into
a model that can be used for determining the community-specific proportion of
resistant pneumococcal isolates at which a change in empiric therapy should be rec-
ommended to clinicians in the community.
Objective C. Investigate the transmission of antimicrobial-resistant
pneumococci through studies of nasopharyngeal colonization.
Several factors have been associated with the emergence of DRSP, most notably
attendance in child day care centers and frequent use of antimicrobial drugs. Because
many earlier studies of pneumococcal transmission were performed before wide-
spread emergence of penicillin resistance, the relevance of these findings for DRSP is
not clear, and several issues regarding the transmission of DRSP remain to be exam-
ined. Identifying these key factors for transmission will help to improve prevention
and control strategies.
To determine the association of nasopharyngeal carriage of DRSP with develop-
ment of invasive DRSP infection, several studies recently have been initiated in
Georgia, Maryland, and Texas. The studies are intended to provide information on
patterns of resistance and proportions of DRSP nasopharyngeal isolates in the
community and their relation to invasive DRSP isolates identified during community-
wide surveillance. If isolates identified through nasopharyngeal cultures are
representative of isolates that cause invasive disease, surveillance of DRSP by using
nasopharyngeal cultures may be useful in areas where laboratory-based surveillance
is not possible. For small population areas, long periods of time may be required to
obtain sufficient numbers of cases of invasive pneumococcal isolates before precise
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estimates of DRSP prevalence can be obtained. In these communities, surveillance by
using nasopharyngeal cultures might provide a more rapid estimate of the prevalence
of DRSP.
Goal III. Prevention and control: minimize complications of
DRSP infections through prevention and control of DRSP
infections.
Objective A. Improve vaccination use nationally, targeting areas most likely
to benefit from intervention (e.g., regions with high levels of resistance to
antimicrobial drugs or communities of persons at highest risk for infection).
A vaccine for the 23 most common serotypes of S. pneumoniae is available, yet
underutilized. Healthy People 2000 objectives target the vaccination of 60% of persons
at risk for pneumococcal illness by the year 2000 (19 ). As of 1993, data from the
National Health Interview Survey indicated that only 27% of persons ≥65 years of age
had been vaccinated (4 ). Reasons for insufficient use of the vaccine differ; however,
vaccine use increases when efforts are made to raise awareness and promote the
benefits of vaccination. Communities with high levels of antimicrobial resistance and
persons at highest risk for infection will benefit from targeted campaigns to increase
rates of vaccination. The 23-valent pneumococcal vaccine is not adequately immuno-
genic in young children; thus, it is not recommended for use in children <2 years of
age, a population at high risk for acute pneumococcal otitis media, bacteremia, and
meningitis.
In conjunction with state health departments and the Health Care Financing Ad-
ministration, CDC is developing and expanding programs to promote the use of
pneumococcal vaccine. By using data obtained from surveillance for DRSP, state and
local health departments can target areas of high-level pneumococcal antimicrobial
resistance for increased vaccination. Promotions for vaccination among the general
public and for targeted groups can be disseminated through media releases, medical
societies, infection-control practitioners, and health-care providers (e.g., health main-
tenance organizations, hospitals, and health clinics).
An effective pneumococcal protein-conjugate vaccine prescribed at least for all
children <2 years of age would be the most effective means of preventing pneumococ-
cal illness in children; however, conjugate vaccines are still being developed and
evaluated. If effective, approved vaccines will likely not be available for several years.
As surveillance for DRSP improves, the prevalence of antimicrobial resistance may
reach levels sufficiently high to warrant changes in the current recommendations for
pneumococcal polysaccharide vaccine use. Such necessary changes may include
reexamining the definition of persons at high risk for pneumococcal infection to in-
crease vaccine use (e.g., by children in day care centers).
Objective B. Promote the judicious use of antimicrobial agents.
Increased use of antimicrobial drugs encourages the spread of resistance and in-
creases the prevalence of drug-resistant strains. Data from hospital-based studies
indicate an association between increased rates of use of antimicrobial agents and
resistant nosocomial infections (20 ); data from studies associating rates of use of
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antimicrobial agents and resistance on a district or national scale indicate a similar
association (21,22 ). In addition, multiple case-control studies have indicated that
previous use of antimicrobial drugs is a substantial risk factor for infection with a re-
sistant pathogen (2,23 ).
Most antimicrobial drugs are administered for treatment of outpatient infections. In
1992, in the United States, an estimated 110 million courses of antimicrobial therapy
were prescribed by office-based physicians—a 28% increase over the number pre-
scribed in 1980 (24 ). Rates of use of antimicrobial agents for children <15 years of age
were approximately three times greater than those for other age groups. In 1990, com-
mon respiratory infections, upper respiratory tract infection, bronchitis, sinusitis, and
pharyngitis were the five leading diagnoses resulting in prescriptions for antimicrobial
drugs.
Although appropriate antimicrobial-drug use has unquestioned benefit, often these
agents are used inappropriately by physicians and the public. The following practices
of physicians may contribute to inappropriate use of antimicrobial drugs:
Providing antibacterial drugs to treat viral infections. In 1992, upper respiratory
tract infections were the second leading indication for outpatient use of antibacterial
drugs (24 ). Studies have demonstrated that antibacterial therapy for nonspecific
upper respiratory infections does not benefit patients because these infections have a
viral etiology but does increase the likelihood that resistant organisms will be
selected.
Using inadequate diagnostic criteria for infections that might have a bacterial eti-
ology. Patients who have a cough and nasal discharge frequently are diagnosed as
having bronchitis and sinusitis—the third and fifth leading diagnoses resulting in out-
patient antimicrobial use (24 ). However, the specificity of these diagnoses for an
infection that truly requires treatment will be low unless appropriate criteria are used
in making the diagnosis. Establishing age-appropriate standards for diagnosing these
conditions would assist physicians in deciding which patients require antimicrobial
therapy and which patients can be sent home with appropriate follow-up and no
antimicrobial drugs. For pharyngitis—the fourth leading diagnosis—standards for di-
agnosis already have been established by the Committee on Infectious Diseases of the
American Academy of Pediatrics (24,25 ); however, these guidelines frequently are not
followed (26 ).
Prescribing expensive, broad-spectrum agents that are unnecessary, determining
improper dose and duration of therapy, and not following established recommenda-
tions for chemoprophylaxis. Although amoxicillin remains an effective first-line
therapy for most children who have otitis media, data from a recent study among
children in a managed-care organization demonstrated that during 1993–1994,
24% and 17% of children with otitis media had been treated with cephalosporins and
combination agents, respectively (CDC, unpublished data). Drugs used for otitis media
prophylaxis included cephalosporins as well as the recommended agents amoxicillin
and sulfisoxazole (25 ).
Reasons for overuse of antimicrobial drugs are manifold. Physicians may be uncer-
tain regarding the optimal approach to diagnosis and the best therapy for an
individual patient, particularly in a community where antimicrobial resistance already
is present. Practices concerning the use of antimicrobial drugs may also be affected by
physicians’ concerns regarding not treating infections potentially caused by bacteria
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and the possibility of subsequent lawsuits from untoward outcomes. Patients and
parents contribute to the misuse of antimicrobial drugs by pressuring physicians to
provide treatment. Developing effective strategies to improve antimicrobial use will
require the recognition that the physician and the patient (or the patient’s parent[s])
are partners in health care and that information must be provided to both groups.
These strategies should ensure that bacterial infections are appropriately treated in
terms of health outcome and cost, while preserving the usefulness of antimicrobial
agents in treating future disease.
Beginning in 1995, CDC, in collaboration with professional societies, managed-care
organizations, and other groups, initiated projects to a) evaluate current knowledge,
attitudes, and behaviors of physicians and the public regarding use of antimicrobial
agents; b) develop standards for diagnosis, therapy, and prophylaxis of common out-
patient respiratory tract infections; c) develop educational materials for providers and
patients/parents by promoting appropriate diagnostic methods and judicious antimi-
crobial use; and d) evaluate the impact of these interventions. Although changing
behaviors regarding the use of antimicrobial drugs will require a long-term, multifac-
eted strategy, these projects will be an important first step in reaching Objective B. 
Objective C. Establish rational treatment guidelines for use by physicians
treating presumptive pneumococcal infections.
Relevant clinical interpretations of data pertaining to antimicrobial resistance
obtained through the proposed surveillance system should be communicated to
clinicians treating patients who have presumed pneumococcal illness. Physicians in
communities that have high levels of antimicrobial resistance should be informed
of appropriate empiric choices of antimicrobial agents. Those in areas that have low
levels resistance also should be informed so that unnecessary drug combinations or
inappropriately broad regimens are not used. This information, which constitutes the
feedback arm of the surveillance system, should be easily accessible to public health
officials and provided regularly to clinicians. 
To establish treatment guidelines, persons from the DRSP working group, profes-
sional societies, academic institutions, state health agencies, and CDC will examine
available data and work to develop recommendations that represent a rational ap-
proach to antimicrobial therapy in the context of increasing antimicrobial resistance.
These guidelines should be used to assist state and local health departments in rec-
ommending appropriate empiric antimicrobial regimens and vaccination strategies
based on susceptibility trends in their jurisdictions. Medical societies, communicable-
disease newsletters, hospitals, and managed-care organizations may be useful
resources for sharing information. Because rapid changes in resistance levels can oc-
cur, surveillance data and recommendations should be communicated to clinicians
either monthly or bimonthly.
Objective D. Periodically publish national and regional trends in
pneumococcal antimicrobial resistance.
Data from the proposed surveillance system will be received at CDC from various
state health departments as described previously in Goal I, Objective C. These data
will be analyzed to develop a national profile of DRSP incidence showing geographic
patterns of pneumococcal resistance. The results of data analyses will be used by
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health-care providers, public health officials, and managed-care organizations to
develop policies regarding DRSP and to develop treatment guidelines. These data also
may give manufacturers of antimicrobial drugs more accurate descriptions of the an-
timicrobial susceptibilities of drugs used to treat pneumococcal infections.
Early in the implementation of the surveillance system, CDC will publish DRSP inci-
dence data quarterly in the MMWR (weekly) indicating individual state totals and
national trends. The data also will be disseminated periodically in appropriate jour-
nals. New regulations from the Food and Drug Administration may require package
inserts for antimicrobial drugs to contain information on antimicrobial susceptibility
obtained from national surveillance databases.
CONCLUSIONS
The DRSP working group’s strategy for surveillance, investigation, prevention, and
control of infections caused by DRSP has focused on implementation of a laboratory-
based, electronic surveillance system for reporting invasive DRSP infections,
increased pneumococcal vaccination, and promotions of judicious use of antimicro-
bial drugs. Data received through the surveillance system will be used to determine
community-specific levels of pneumococcal antimicrobial resistance. This information
will be made available to health-care providers and clinicians to promote appropriate
use of antimicrobial drugs and increased vaccine use. The intended outcome of the
surveillance system is to control the spread of DRSP and to minimize complications of
DRSP infection (e.g., greater duration and severity of illness, long-term sequelae,
health-care expenditures, and mortality). The strategy is intended to be flexible and
may change on the basis of information obtained during initial phases of its imple-
mentation and on results of new studies.
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Appendix: Laboratory-Based Surveillance System
I. Components and operation of the laboratory-based
surveillance system
A. Definitions
The proposed surveillance system is intended to monitor only invasive pneu-
mococcal infections and their antimicrobial susceptibility patterns. For this
system, invasive pneumococcal infection refers only to meningitis and bac-
teremia identified by isolation of S. pneumoniae from cerebrospinal fluid (CSF)
or blood, respectively. The system is not intended to monitor isolates obtained
from respiratory secretions. Although information from respiratory isolates
may be useful, the large number of sputum specimens routinely collected from
patients who have pneumonia would likely overwhelm a surveillance system
initially. Addition of surveillance for respiratory isolates might be considered in
the future, depending upon ease of implementing surveillance, available re-
sources, and expected utility. The following definitions have been approved by
the Council of State and Territorial Epidemiologists (CSTE) for drug-resistant
Streptococcus pneumoniae  (DRSP) surveillance:
1. Confirmed case
A confirmed case of invasive DRSP is defined as either meningitis or bactere-
mia in which S. pneumoniae  cultured from CSF or blood is identified as
nonsusceptible (using National Committee for Clinical Laboratory Standards
[NCCLS] methods and breakpoints) to antimicrobial drugs currently ap-
proved for treating pneumococcal infections.
When oxacillin disk screening is the only antimicrobial susceptibility method
used, the antimicrobial susceptibility profile cannot be definitely determined.
For these instances, a probable case definition is needed.
2. Probable case
To obtain data from laboratories that perform only oxacillin screening, a
probable case definition has been made. A probable case of invasive DRSP
is defined as either meningitis or bacteremia in which S. pneumoniae
cultured from CSF or blood is identified as nonsusceptible by oxacillin
screening (i.e., zone size ≤19 mm) and no further antimicrobial susceptibility
testing has been performed.
B. Reporting
Laboratories will be required to report probable or confirmed cases of DRSP
to their state health departments in a line-listed manner to include the pa-
tient’s date of birth or age, the anatomic site of specimen collection, the date of
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specimen collection, the antimicrobial susceptibility pattern, and unique iden-
tifiers for the laboratory and the specimen. The patient’s first and last name
also will be required at the state level; however, CDC will not have personal
identifiers. Measures will be taken to protect sensitive health information. Cur-
rent reporting software supports the capability to encrypt names, allowing
personal identifiers to be removed. Having the encrypted name along with
laboratory and specimen identifiers allows duplicate reports to be identified. To
reduce duplicate reporting of isolates from the same episode of clinical illness,
isolates from the same patient will not be added to the surveillance database if
the specimen submission date is within 10 days of a previous report.
To determine the incidence and prevalence of DRSP, the total number of
invasive site isolates tested (i.e., denominator data) must be determined. De-
nominator data will be essential for providing relevant clinical information to
physicians and other health-care providers (see Goal III, Objectives C and D).
For laboratories with computerized data management, all invasive site isolates
can be reported in the same manner as previously described. Laboratories
unable to provide data easily in this manner should report aggregate denomi-
nator data monthly; data would include the total number of invasive site
isolates tested by age group (<6 years of age, 6–17 years, and ≥18 years of age)
and anatomic collection site (i.e., CSF or blood).
The data being collected for surveillance may be readily available from the
computerized records of many laboratories. This information may be imported
from laboratory computer files into a currently available standardized database
format, which may be either transmitted electronically or sent by mailed
diskette to the state health departments and subsequently to CDC. Ideally,
computerized laboratories would be able to provide data output in Health Level
Seven (HL7) standard format, or in a compatible standard format, for transmis-
sion to the state health department, where the data could be retrieved by
compatible software. HL7 is being used increasingly as a standard for coding
and electronically transmitting hospital and laboratory data, and its continued
use as a standard should be encouraged by CDC, CSTE, and Association of
State and Territorial Public Health Laboratory Directors (ASTPHLD). These HL7
standards and specifications should be made readily available to laboratory
information systems (LIS) vendors and large national reference laboratories.
Initially, the system would be piloted in selected cities. Ultimately, it is intended
to be a comprehensive, population-based system for U.S. laboratories certified
in accordance with the Clinical Laboratories Improvement Amendment (CLIA)
of 1988, including hospital laboratories, commercial laboratories, and state
public health laboratories.
C. Data management and dissemination
Data will be stored in three locations: the laboratory data repository, state
health departments, and CDC. State-specific information regarding DRSP
prevalence will be maintained at the respective state health departments and
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will be used to provide regular feedback of regional data to hospitals, laborato-
ries, and clinicians (see Goal III, Objective C). Data merged from multiple
laboratories will be periodically transmitted electronically to state health
departments and CDC. These data will be compiled to determine DRSP preva-
lence data by state and to provide a quarterly national summary report (see
Goal III, Objective D). State health departments will have the ability to restrict
certain data fields, such as personal identifiers, before sending data to CDC.
The quarterly results of the merged surveillance information will be published
in journals accessible to laboratorians and clinicians. Data presented in a
graphic format will reflect regional variations and temporal changes.
II. Phases of implementation
The surveillance system will be implemented in four phases: pilot, addition of
laboratories in the pilot community, expansion to other laboratories, and nation-
wide laboratory participation.
A. Phase 1. Pilot study
Two laboratories in New Jersey (one in Camden County and one in Middlesex
County) have been identified for participation. These counties are the site of a
vaccine demonstration study currently being conducted with CDC assistance.
Both laboratories provide services to large academic centers and have agreed
to participate in the pilot phase of the implementation of the surveillance
system. These and other laboratories in New Jersey have been participating
in surveillance of methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA),
vancomycin-resistant enterococcus (VRE), and DRSP through a traditional sur-
veillance mechanism that uses paper report forms. Implementing the pilot
phase in New Jersey allows for introduction of electronic reporting in an envi-
ronment where reporting is already required and familiar to laboratories.
A review of the computer capabilities and laboratory practices of the two par-
ticipating laboratories was performed in early January 1995. Initial site visits
were made to introduce the hospitals to the electronic surveillance system.
During a trial period after the initiation of the pilot, data will be collected and
electronically transmitted to the state health department. Software will be
available at the state level for analysis and for transmission to CDC. After the
data are transmitted to CDC at the end of the first month of collection, the sys-
tem will be evaluated and improved.
B. Phase 2. Addition of laboratories in the pilot community
In Phase 2, laboratories in the same counties as the two pilot laboratories will
be added to the surveillance system. Phase 2 should begin approximately
90 days after initiation of Phase 1. Laboratories will be evaluated for participa-
tion in the following manner:
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1. Laboratory survey
Through a mailed questionnaire, laboratories in the pilot area will be
surveyed to determine the methods used for susceptibility testing of pneu-
mococcal isolates and to determine the level of computer capability in the
laboratory.
2. Assessment of laboratories
Laboratories capable of participation in the pilot should meet the following
criteria:
• Perform pneumococcal susceptibility testing by using NCCLS interpre-
tive standards,
• Enter and report laboratory data by using computers,
• Have a laboratory software package capable of being translated to a
database software through downloaded ASCII text, Health Level 7
standard format, or a comparable standard format,
• Have a personal computer (at least a 386 processor) with a modem
(≥2400 bps), capable of running PHLIS (Public Health Laboratory Infor-
mation System) version 3.1, and
• Have personnel available and willing to implement the pilot study.
Laboratories meeting the criteria will be involved in Phase 2. Those laborato-
ries not yet capable of electronic reporting will be encouraged to enhance
their present system to participate in later phases. In the two pilot sites,
19 laboratories are expected to participate.
3. Implementation and evaluation
Data from the participating laboratories will be transmitted to the state
health department at least once a month. At the end of each 30-day period,
the state health department will transmit the data to CDC. The system will be
evaluated and improved.
C. Phase 3. Expansion of surveillance to other laboratories
During Phase 3, laboratories in communities that have ongoing population-
based pneumococcal studies will be enrolled. These studies may be
CDC-sponsored emerging infections programs or other surveillance projects.
Implementing surveillance in communities that have ongoing studies will en-
able comparisons to be made between the new, electronic, laboratory-based
surveillance and the present standard for surveillance. Four to seven states
are expected to have communities participating. When the surveillance is es-
tablished within those communities with ongoing pneumococcal studies,
expansion to include all laboratories within the state will begin. Implementa-
tion of Phase 3 is expected by late 1996.
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D. Phase 4. Nationwide laboratory participation
Laboratories will be added to the surveillance system, with an estimated par-
ticipation of 70% of clinical laboratories nationwide by 1998. Expansion of the
surveillance system to include other laboratory-reportable illnesses is ex-
pected. The system proposed in the strategy is intended to utilize software and
data transmission standards to allow coordination with other systems for re-
porting.
III. System attributes
The proposed surveillance system is intended to simplify data reporting by using
information that is currently being collected in many laboratories. The system is
flexible because the software used to manage and transmit the data will be able
to accommodate other laboratory reportable diseases in the future. The system
facilitates timely feedback to the laboratories and health departments because in-
cidence of DRSP can be determined using the software both in the laboratory and
in the health department. 
IV. Utility
The surveillance system is intended to provide public health officials, clinicians,
and health-care providers with data that can be used to prevent and control DRSP
infections. In addition, the DRSP surveillance system is intended to be a model for
the introduction of electronic, laboratory-based reporting of communicable dis-
eases. Inherent in the implementation and maintenance of the surveillance
system is the ability to change the components or the focus of surveillance to
respond to results of new studies and emerging problems. Given the dynamic
nature of DRSP, predicting the rate at which resistance to antimicrobial drugs will
increase communitywide and nationwide is difficult. Surveillance may be scaled
back and performed at selected sites when geographic and temporal variations in
DRSP incidence are no longer apparent.
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